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ABSTRACT

This thesis studies the price discrimination through the drug’s market. Using the data
from the USA and Chinese drugs’ markets, we are looking for the factors what might
affect the price discrimination. Counting the price per mg/ml and classifying the drugs by
the diseases, we find that the price discrimination of the anti-infective drugs is the
smallest in both countries, the drugs’ prices are positively related to the price
discrimination, and the standard deviation of the American drug's prices is smaller than
the standard deviation of the Chinese drug’s prices.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

When you go to the drug store, you will find the same drugs with different strengths. But most of us do not
pay attention to the price difference among therm. After counting the price per mg/ml, we find that the higher
the strength every pill, the cheaper the price per mg/ml, and we assume this is the price discrimination.

The manufacture could use many ways to increase the profits, such as the bundling, and so on. Price
discrimination is one of these ways, and many economists write many papers about this topic. In this thesis,
we are going to use the medicine industry to analyze the price discrimination. This thesis just studies the
price discrimination among the drugs with different strengths, ignoring other potential factors.

The price discrimination is that the producers use the price difference to increase the profits. The price
discrimination contains the first-degree, the second-degree and the third-degree price discrimination. The
first degree price discrimination is making the prices different as to different customer. In this degree, the
producers should have all the information of the customers, which does not exist in the real life. The second
degree price discrimination is varying the prices according to the sales. If you buy more, you will get the
lower unit price. This price discrimination is very widespread. The third degree price discrimination is that
make the price different based on the location and the customer segment. For example, there is one hair salon
set two different prices to the students and the non-students, and the salon offers the lower price to the
students, because the student has the more elastic price elasticity of the demand.

Not all the markets could take the price discrimination. It must satisfy three conditions to take the price
discrimination. First, the information of this industry should be asymmetric. The customer should know less
1

information than the sellers, such as the drug store, and the hospital. Second, classifying the customer of this
market should not be too hard. The last one is that the price elasticity of this market is best to be very small.
So the limiting the trades and the regional blockade are helpful to the price discrimination.

The drugs market satisfies the above conditions. The drug’s market has the patent to limit the entry. Unlike
the rice, not everyone could enter this market. And the people who could know the real function of the drugs
are just the doctors and some other workers in the health system. So the information of this market is
asymmetric. Then the patients could be classified by the diseases easily. Moreover, every drug related to the
specific disease, so the replacement of the drugs is very small. Even the producers increase the price, the
customers have to keep health, and accept the price.

On the other side, the drug’s price is also another hot topic of the economists. The price of the medicine is
one of the most important factors that influence the health and the security of the people, and the health level
in the whole country. People always complain that the drug’s price is too high, while the drug’s producer and
dealers always want to earn more profits. As to the government, it not only wants to reduce the price of the
drugs, but also does not want to hurt the profits of the drug’s producers and dealers. Only if the producers get
the money, they could have the funds and the motive to create the new drugs.

We are trying to figure out that which factors will affect the price discrimination. This thesis includes some
factors, such as the existing number of the same drugs, the mean price of the drugs, and the policy of the
government and so on. In order to test these factors, we use the price per mg/ml as the basic data to count the
mean and the standard deviation and build the linear regression model.
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The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter Two is the literature review, which is about the price
discrimination in every field, and the analysis about drug’s prices. The methodology & hypothesis are
concluded in the Chapter Three. Chapter Four and Five are about the data and the results of the application.
And the final part is the conclusion.

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

There are many papers about the price discrimination or related to the price differential.

In this paper, we use the price per mg/ml to analyze data. And this idea comes from the Chorniy and
Maloney (2010)’s paper. In this paper, the authors use the price discrimination to explain the phenomenon
that some drugs are priced by pills and some drugs are priced by milligram of the active ingredient.
3

The data used in this paper covers 171 unique drugs, and the prices of these drugs come from <Medco.com>.
Used these data, the authors build one model to test the correlations between the likelihood of pricing per pill
and four factors. And they are the drug divisibility, the disease severity, the degree of competition of the
market and the drug popularity.

Finally, the results of the experiment shows that the positive relationship between the indivisibility property
of a drug and the likelihood of pricing per pill, and the positive relationship between the price per daily dose
and the likelihood of pricing per pill.

The papers studying the price discrimination in the drug industry are very few, but the papers about the price
discrimination in other industry are very many. Borenstein and Rose (1994) analyze price dispersion in the
U.S. airline industry. The data of this thesis are the 10 percent random sample of U.S. airline (11 major U.S.
airlines) tickets sold in the second quarter of 1986.

The tool of measuring price dispersion or inequality is the Gini coefficient (GINI) of fares paid on. The Gini
coefficient of .10 implies the expected absolute price difference of 20 percent of the mean fare. They
conclude that the expected difference in prices paid by two passengers selected at random on a route is about
36 percent of the airline's mean ticket price on the route. Meanwhile, the dispersion of the ticket price may
are not only from variations in the serving different passengers’ costs, but also from discriminatory pricing.
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One interesting discovery of this paper is that the price dispersion is positively related to the competition.
The limitation of this paper is that the data of this paper could not test all the cost-based explanations of price
dispersion, such as the most notably peak-load pricing under stochastic demand.

Leslie (2004) writes a model containing the second-degree and third-degree price discrimination. Using the
example of Broadway Theater, the author builds the model of individual consumer behavior and monopoly
price discrimination to analyze the welfare implications of price discrimination.

The data of this paper contain the price and quantity of the play sold for all 17 different ticket categories for
all 199 performances of Seven Guitars in 1996. In this paper, the author builds various experiments to test the
pricing policies, and conclude that the tested price discrimination increases the profit by 5%, compared to a
policy of optimal uniform pricing.

Borzekowski, Thomadsen and Taragin (2005) also build one model to analyze the second-degree and the
third-degree price discrimination. In this paper, the authors use the mailing lists’ market to test the
relationship between competition and price discrimination. The advantage, using the mailing list industry to
analyze the model, is that that lists are zero marginal-cost goods. In other word, the different prices come
from the different demand, and have nothing to do with the cost.

They test the sellers would prefer to classify consumers by providing a menu of choices (second-degree price
discrimination) or providing different prices to different groups of consumers (third-degree price
discrimination) in more competitive markets.

5

This paper concludes that mailing list industry increases the price discrimination as the market becomes more
competitive, for both the second- and third-degree price discrimination. Specifically, as to the second-degree
price discrimination, when the market becomes more competitive, the producer will offer more options on
the menus to the customers. And the authors offer two reasons to support the conclusion.

Dhar and Hoch (1996) compare the effectiveness of in-store coupons (promote buys) and straight off-theshelf price discounts (bonus buys), in generating incremental sales and profits for the retailer.

This thesis focuses on two different retailer in-store mechanisms to attract the customers. One is the off-theshelf price discounts that offering the customers price discounts at check-out as the form of the point-ofpurchase; the other is that offering the customers the in-store discount, and the coupon directly put in the
front of the product.

The dataset of this thesis is that the results of five field tests in an 86 outlet supermarket chain. In the results
of the five tests, coupons increase the profits by 35%, and the promoted items have a 108% greater increase
in retailer profits than do the bonus buys with the same level of discount. The profits with coupons are
greater than that with discounts, because of the redemption rate of 55%.

Finally, the authors conclude that unit category sales and dollar category profits are higher with coupons.
Meanwhile, the findings are generalizable and hold over a wide range of parameter values.
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However, the paper has some limits. The authors could not tell the difference between the theory-based
explanations for the higher sales effect observed for coupons. And the author did not explain clearly the
reasons why coupons generate the greater sales in the tests.

Locay and Rodriguez (1992) present the models that in the perfectly competitive market, the choice of the
consumers are constrained by their groups’ choices, and the price discrimination of a two-part price exists in
such competitive market because of the constrains of the groups.

What is the extra content of the two-part price? The authors explain that the two-part price is composed of an
entrance fee and the price of the rides. Take a movie theater as an example, the two-part price contains the
entrance fee and the price of the popcorn. The entrance fee gives the consumers to have the right to watch a
movie and purchase the popcorn.

After analyzing the data, the authors point out that the entry fee is less than the marginal cost, and the
popcorn fee is above the marginal cost. Making the prices of the popcorn above the marginal cost, the movie
theater will get more profits from the customer with large surplus than it will lose in the entrance fee. So the
movie theater make the popcorn above the marginal cost is the optimal choice.

In sum, this paper has successfully shown that the group purchasing could constrain the individuals to allow
price discrimination even in competitive industry.
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Clemens (1951) states that the price discrimination and multiple product production are the essence of
customary action. Unless the firm discriminate the pricing policy, or differentiate the product line, or invade
new markets, he predicts that the firm will die in the market.

Using a spatial model of monopolistic competition, Borenstein (1985) examine third-degree price
discrimination in free-entry, zero-profit markets.

Firstly, this paper eliminates the misunderstanding, and points out that the price discrimination exists in the
free entry market.

Secondly, the paper introduces that classifying the reservation price and the strength of brand preference
differentiates the price of the same product. In this part, the author provides that the consumers are different
in the utility they get from the product, and in the strength of the preference on the different brands.

Thirdly, the author also conclude that, as to the same kind of product in the competitive market, sorting the
products based on the strength of brand preference is more effective than selecting the products based on the
reservation price of the consumers.

Stavins (2001) tests that the price discrimination is positively related to the competition of the airline market.
More specifically, the author uses the marginal implicit prices of ticket restrictions (Saturday-night stayover
requirements and advanced-purchase discounts) as a example for price discrimination and compares those
marginal effects across routes to test the relationship between the airlines discrimination and the competition
in that market.
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The dataset contains the information about 5,804 tickets of the twelve routes’ flights on a day: Thursday,
September 28, 1995. Based on the information, the author concludes that price dispersion leads to ticket
restrictions increases when market becomes more competitive, and that price discrimination decreases when
the market concentrates.

Shepard (1991) analyzes the microdata on gasoline retailing to demonstrate the price discrimination based on
willingness to pay for quality exists in multifirm markets.

This paper builds a experiment in which firms have same cost of production, but have different ability to
discriminate the prices. And the different price structures of firms are the evidence of price discrimination.

The author compares the price difference of the gasoline between the multiproduct stations offering both fullservice and self-service gasoline and the single-product stations offering only one of these two kinds of
service. Obviously, a multiproduct station could price discriminate because it can set two prices, while a
single-product station cannot because it has only one price.

The data used to test the price discrimination hypothesis are the retail prices and characteristics for all 1,527
stations in a four-county area in eastern Massachusetts. Finally, the data demonstrate that price
discrimination at the retail level adds at least 9 cents a gallon to the average price of full-service gasoline.
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Although the data supports the price discrimination hypothesis, the test is built on a single geographic area
and has two limits. First, the distribution of retail configurations is not common. Second, these data pertain to
a densely stationed area.

Besanko, Dube, and Gupta (2003) was trying to study whether a retailer could just base on the weekly store
level aggregate sales and marketing-mix information to make targeted pricing.

The dataset of this thesis is the aggregate retail data, which is a novel approach relative to other papers. The
retailers could access to these data. The authors estimate a discrete choice demand system with latent
consumer segments, with a structural model of uniform pricing by manufacturers and the retailer.

Moreover, the authors point out that the taste heterogeneity of the customers makes it is possible for the
retails to price discriminate by setting different prices across consumer segments.

Busse and Rysman (2005) study the association between competition and price discrimination in the market
for Yellow Pages advertising.

The dataset of this paper is cross-sectional and contain the price for all advertisement sold at every directory
published in1997 whose publisher is a member of the YPPA (YPPA is an industry trade group that represents
95% of the sales in the industry).

The authors conclude that the increased competition between directories leads to the decrease in prices.
While the competition increases in this market, the rate of discounting increases. And the purchasers of the
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largest ads pay less per ad size relative to purchasers of small ads in more-competitive directories. In other
words, an increase in the competition measure is that one additional competitor is associated with a more
than 12% lower full-page ad price, but only a 6% lower price for a quarter-column ad.

Khan and Jain (2005) analyze that the retailers usually use different kinds of price discrimination to increase
profits. In this paper, the authors compare the results of the two price discrimination mechanism: quantity
discounts based on package size (second-degree price discrimination) and store-level pricing or
micromarketing (third-degree price discrimination).

The dataset of this paper come from a large supermarket in the Chicago area. Comparing the profits from
quantity discounts based on package size to store-level pricing, the author conclude that the quantity discount
set on the package size contributes more to profits than setting the store-level pricing. And the reason is that
quantity discounts could catch a larger part of the heterogeneity in demand than the store-level pricing does.

Cohen (2006) builds a structural model of consumer demand and firm pricing behavior to test the effects of
multiple package sizes in the paper towel industry. And this model is based on two assumptions: (1) each
brand may only offer its small size; (2) each brand must charge a uniform unit-price for all its sizes.

The data are collected from 64 cities and 8 quarters (1997- 1998) by Information Resources Incorporated
(IRI). The sample contains the price and volume measures for each of the paper towels, and almost 512
potential observations on each product.
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Basing on the data and the model, the author indicates that competition in the multi-roll package size
segment increases the consumer surplus and reduces the retail prices. Meanwhile, the measure indicates that
34 - 46% of the price discounts comes from the price discrimination, with the rest being cost-driven. Finally,
the author states that consumers purchasing multi-roll packages could get more options and lower prices, and
consumers purchasing one-roll packages could get the lower prices because the multi-roll segment make the
market more competitive.

In this thesis, we collect the medicine prices of America and China, and compare them together. Some
economists already worked on many papers about the cross-national differences in pharmaceutical prices.
Danzon and Furukawa (2003) has compared average price levels for pharmaceuticals in eight countries—
Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, and the United Kingdom—relative to the United
States.

The dataset of this paper are about the manufacturer-price levels, from the IMS Health Midas. The unit of
analysis in the dataset is the molecule-indication, and they are the active ingredient and the IMS three-digit
anatomical therapeutic class. Meanwhile all these data are the represents of the originator products, not the
small numbers of some products. So the dataset of this paper is more accurate.

And the result of the comparison is that the Japan’s prices are higher than U.S. prices, other countries’ prices
are from 6% to33% lower than U.S. prices, and Canadian prices to be the lowest.
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY & HYPOTHESIS

In order to study the price discrimination among the different strengths, we choose the drugs with different
strengths, and calculate the price per mg/ml and the price per pill/capsule/bottle. The formula to calculate the
price per mg/ml and the price per pill/capsule/bottle:

Price per mg/ml =

price per package
number of the drugs in package × strength of each drug

Price per pill/capsule/bottle =

price per package
number of the bottle/pill/capsule in package

All the calculation is based on the price per mg/ml. We calculate the mean and the standard deviation of the
price per mg/ml. Regard to a drug with different strengths, the mean expresses the average price of price per
mg/ml, and the standard deviation denotes the discrete degree of the prices per mg/ml. More specifically, the
mean of the prices per mg/ml shows the price of this drug, and the standard deviation means the degree of the
price discrimination among different strengths.

We classify the drugs based on the diseases that the drugs are used to heal. The drugs are classified to 8
categories. And they are Anti-infective, Cardiovascular system drugs, and so on (for details see Appendix).
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Basing on the data, we use the mortality of diseases, the number of the strengths, the nations of the drugs, the
mean of the price per mg/ml, and the different kinds of drugs to analyze the price discrimination.

Then we list the presumptions of our models.

Firstly, the number of the existing unique drugs in one category is one of the factors affect the price
discrimination. Compared to other drugs, the number of the existing anti-infective drugs is the largest. So the
replacement of the anti-infective is higher than any other drugs. The replacement of the products is positively
related to the price elasticity of demand (absolute value).

Thus, the productions of the anti-infective could not increase too much price. If the price of the anti-infective
is higher than other anti-infective drugs, the customer may choose other anti-infective drugs. So we conclude
that the price elasticity of the anti-infective is the highest and the price discrimination of the anti-infective
drugs is the lowest.

The drug’s price is the second factor affecting the price discrimination. In this situation, the producer
classifies the customer by the purchase ability. Different group of customer will choose different drugs with
the different prices. The customers with the high purchase ability prefer to buy the best drugs in this field.
Sometimes the high prices imply the high quality. So if the producers increase the price discrimination
among the kind of drugs, the sales of the drugs with high prices could not change and the profits of these
drugs increase. We conclude that the price of the drugs is positively related to the price discrimination.
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Another factor is the mortality rate of the disease. The mortality rate is higher, which means the scale of the
consumers is large. If the customers of the drug spread widely, the producer needs to produce too many
different kinds of strengths to satisfy the demand. In other words, this kinds of drugs should have more
different strengths than other drugs healing the high mortality rate disease. Thus, compared to the drugs
healing the low-mortality rate disease, the drugs healing the high-mortality rate disease have the higher price
discrimination among the different strengths.

Meanwhile, the fourth factor is the number of the different strengths among any unique drugs. The producers
provide much different strengths of one unique drug to increase the price discrimination. Based on the
different demand of the drug, the produce classify the drugs into different strengths every pills. They try to
sell the drug to different groups of consumer to earn the largest profits. The policy that the producer makes
one drug into different strengths helps the producer to take the price discrimination. In other word, the larger
number of the different strengths among one unique drug means the higher price discrimination among
different strengths. Thus, we assume that the number of different strengths is positively related to the price
discrimination within the different strengths.

The last factor is the different health system among different countries. We use the drug’s prices from the
USA and China. The price discrimination of these two countries must be different. In the USA, the
foundation and the development of the drug’s market are based on the rules of the market, not the control of
the government. On the other hand, 90 percentage of the Chinese health care market is still owned by the
public hospitals. This market has not really turned into the “privacy”. In order to increase the profits, these
hospitals take the rule that “using the drugs to supply the doctors”. Then chief aim of the hospitals is not to
serve the patient, but rather selling the drugs. Usually after the hospital has bought from the drug’s producers,
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the drug’s price has been increase by 15%. But the reality is more than that ratio, because of that rule. So we
could think the price discrimination of different strengths in China is higher than that in the USA.

CHAPTER FOUR
DATA

We choose 118 unique drugs from two countries’ markets, China and the USA. Among these unique drugs,
58 are the USA drugs, and 60 are Chinese drugs. And every unique drug contains different strengths with
different prices.
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The prices of the Chinese drugs come from the Panwan hospital and <yy.jspn.net>. Panwan is my hometown,
and the whole town just has one hospital; and website is the official website to public the prices of drugs in
the whole province. The prices of the USA drugs come from <Medco.com> (Pricing Strategies in
Pharmaceuticals Retail, Chorniy & Maloney, 2010).

On the other hand, we get the mortality rate of different drugs from the WHO. We use the report of the global
burden disease (2008) (website: http://apps.who.int/ghodata/?vid=10012#). We use the mortality rate of the
region of the Americas denotes the mortality rate of the USA, and the mortality rate of the Western Pacific
Region denotes the mortality rate of the China. The formula for the mortality rate of the disease:

Mortality Rate =

The number of the dead people
× 1000 ‰
The number of the total population of this region

How to find the diseases that the drugs are used to heal? The standard of classifying is from the Chinese
website <souhu.com>. In this website, it has a medicine and health channel, where you could check which
diseases that drug is used to treat. And the Appendix already has the categories of diseases. Then we get the
categories of the drugs, based on the Appendix. We give an example to express how we related the drugs to
these 8 categories. Just take the central nervous system drugs as an example (see table 4.1).

Basing on the prices per mg/ml of every drug, we count the means and standard deviations of the prices per
mg/ml. Then we count the means and the standard deviations of the mean of the price per mg/ml, the
standard deviation of the price per mg/ml, and the number of different strengths in every specified category.
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Finally, the table 4.2 is the results. And in this table, the number of the observation is the totally number of
drugs, not just the unique drugs.

From that table, the means of the price per mg/ml of the anti-infective drugs in two countries have the least
standard deviations among all drugs, and the standard deviations of the price per mg/ml of the anti-infective
drugs have the smallest standard deviation among all drugs of two countries.

Table 4.1 : Central Nervous System Drugs
disease
Epilepsy

the USA drugs

China drugs

Keppra
Clonazepam

Trileptal
Zonegran
Insomnia (primary)

Lunesta

Nitrazepam Hydrochloride

Parkinson disease

-------

Levodopa

Alzheimer and other
dementias

Exelon

Piracetam

Namenda
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Abilify

Schizophrenia

Clozapine

Geodon

Alcohol use disorders

Campral

-------

Cancidas
Migraine

Axert

--------

Unipolar depressive disorders

Cymbalta

--------

Table 4.2 – Summary

number
of
different
strengths

Disease

the USA
price
mean
($)

China
price

standard
deviatio
n

obs

Anti-infective

mean
sd

2.875
(1.458)

0.072
(0.116)

0.038
(0.092)

23

Cardiovascular
System

mean
sd

4.250
(1.258)

3.644
(6.881)

2.402
(4.494)

17

19

number
of
different mean($
strength )
s
3.214
0.003
(1.101) (0.004)
5.200
(2.387)

0.021
(0.039)

standard
deviatio
n

obs

0.001
(0.001)

90

0.014
(0.029)

24

Antineoplastic

mean
sd

2.500
(0.837)

12.418
(12.844)

3.638
(8.695)

14

2.800
(0.447)

0.267
(0.516)

0.081
(0.128)

14

Gastointestinal
Tract

mean
sd

3.000
(1.732)

13.16
(19.064)

4.171
(6.388)

15

3.800
(2.168)

0.007
(0.009)

0.001
(0.001)
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Central
Nervous
system

mean

4.833

1.406

0.687

58

4.800

0.003

0.001

24

sd

(3.099)

(1.915)

(0.779)

(1.304)

(0.006)

(0.001)

Hematologic

mean
sd

3.667
(0.577)

6.238
(10.676)

1.802
(3.109)

11

5.000
(3.162)

0.234
(0.439)

0.349
(0.698)
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Hormonal

mean
sd

2.643
(0.633)

30.065
(90.616)

17.002
(53.668)

37

3.000
(1.414)

0.003
(0.003)

0.003
(0.004)

6

Immunologic

mean
sd

3.000
(0.000)

6.250
(5.194)

0.058
(0.056)

6

6.500
(2.121)

1.645
(2.256)

0.986
(1.369)

13

mean

2.5

0.296

0.138

10

3.250

1.078

0.040

13

sd

(1.000)

(0.297)

(0.141)

(0.957)

(1.933)

(0.075)

Genitourinary
System

20

CHAPTER FIVE
RUSULTS

Because we could not find the mortality rates of some drugs or the mortality rates of all drugs in the same
category are the same, we firstly analyze the price discrimination of five categories’ drugs, such as the antiinfective drugs, gastrointestinal tract drugs, cardiovascular system drugs, Central nervous System drugs and
Antineoplastic drugs with mean, number of different strengths, mortality and so on. Then, we analyze the price

discrimination of all drugs we collected without the mortality variables.

Firstly, we analyze the regression model of five different categories’ drugs. We suppose that the mean, the
number of different strengths, the mortality rate, and the mean of the price per mg/ml are the independent
variables, and the standard deviation is the predicted value of the dependent variable.

Standard Deviation = βˆo + βˆ1Mean Price + βˆ2 Number of Different Strengths + βˆ3 Mortality （Model I）

And the results of the Model I are in the Table 5.1. In the Table 5.1, the values of most R-squares are very
close to the 1. As we all know that the closer the R-square is to one, the better our model is. If the R-square
equals to one, the linear regression provides the perfect predictions. So the linear regressions we used in this
thesis could explain how the factors affect the prices discrimination.

From Table 5.1, all the mean’s the parameter estimates are positive, which is the same as we predict. As to
the mortality rate of the diseases and the numbers of different strengths, we could not get the unique
conclusion for all these different categories’ drugs.
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Then we put all the data of these five categories’ drugs together to build the Mortality Sample Model. We set
the mean, the number of different strengths, the mortality rate, and the mean of the price per mg/ml to be the
independent variables, and the standard deviation of the price per mg/ml to be the dependent variable.

Standard Deviation = βˆo + βˆ1Mean Price + βˆ2 Number of Different Strengths +
βˆ Mortality +δˆT + αˆ D + αˆ D + αˆ D + αˆ D
3

i

1

1i

2

2i

3

3i

4

（Mortality Sample

4i

Model）

We use the Ti to stand for the nations, and the Di to stand for the standard deviation of different kinds of
drugs. When Ti=1, the equation stands for the standard deviation of USA drugs; when Ti=0, the equation
stands for the standard deviation of the China drugs. When D1i=1, the equation stands for the standard
deviation of the anti-infective drugs; when D1i=0, the equation stands for the standard deviation of the other
drugs. When D2i=1, the equation stands for the standard deviation of the anti-neoplastic drugs; when D2i=0,
the equation stands for the standard deviation of the other drugs. When D3i=1, the equation stands for the
standard deviation of the cardiovascular drugs; when D3i=0, the equation stands for the standard deviation of
the other drugs. When D4i=1, the equation stands for the standard deviation of the central nervous system
drugs; when D4i=0, the equation stands for the standard deviation of the other drugs. When
D1i=D2i=D3i=D4i=0, the equation stands for the standard deviation of the gastrointestinal tract drugs.

The results of this Mortality Sample Model are in Table 5.3. The price discrimination of the antineoplastic
drugs is the smallest. And the parameter estimator of α5 is -0.269, which means the standard deviation of the
antineoplastic drugs is lower 0.269 than that of the gastrointestinal tract drugs, which is lowest compared to
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other 3 drugs. Because we use the standard deviation to test the degree of the price discrimination, the price
discrimination of the central nervous system drugs is the smallest, which is not the same as we predict.

The price of the drugs is positively related to the price discrimination among the drugs with different
strengths. The parameter estimator of the β1 is 0.398, which is same as our assumption. And the mortality
rate is negatively related to the price discrimination, and the parameter estimator of theβ3 is 601.109, the
same as our assumption. On the other hand, the numbers of different strengths’ parameter estimates is 0.099,
which is the same as our prediction.

The last discover is that the standard deviation of the American drug's prices is smaller than the standard
deviation of the Chinese drug’s prices. From table 5.3, the parameter estimator of δis -0.107, which proves
the standard deviation of the Chinese drugs is higher 0.107 than that of the USA drugs. So we could conclude
that the price discrimination of the USA drugs is smaller than that of the Chinese drugs.

Basing on this Mortality Sample Model, we eliminate one variable, the mean of the price per mg/ml, to check
whether the results might change or not. And the results are still in table 5.3. The Mortality and the number
of different strengths are still positively related to the standard deviation. But the price discrimination of the
USA drugs is higher, and the price discrimination of the central nervous drugs is the lowest.

Thirdly, we analyze the regression model including all the drugs we collected. Compared to the Mortality
Sample Model, the Full Sample Model eliminates one dependent variable, the mortality rate of the disease,
and adds the data of the hematologic drugs, the hormonal drugs, the immunologic drugs, and the
genitourinary system drugs.
23

Standard Deviation = βˆo + βˆ1 Mean Price + βˆ 2 Number of Different Strengths + δˆTi
(Full Sample
+αˆ1 D1i + αˆ 2 D 2 i + αˆ 3 D3 i + αˆ 4 D 4 i + αˆ 5 D 5 i + αˆ 6 D 6 i + αˆ 7 D 7 i + αˆ 8 D8 i
Model)

In this model, we still use the Ti to stand for the nations, and the Di to stand for the standard deviation of
different kinds of drugs. Compared to the Mortality Sample Model, this model just includes four new letters.
When D5i=1, the equation stands for the standard deviation of gastrointestinal tract drugs; when D5i=0, the
equation stands for the standard deviation of the other drugs. When D6i=1, the equation stands for the
standard deviation of the hematologic drugs; when D6i=0, the equation stands for the standard deviation of
the other drugs. When D7i=1, the equation stands for the standard deviation of the hormonal drugs; when
D7i=0, the equation stands for the standard deviation of the other drugs. When D8i=1, the equation stands for
the standard deviation of the immunologic drugs; when D8i=0, the equation stands for the standard deviation
of the other drugs. When D1i=D2i=D3i=D4i= D5i=D6i=D7i=D8i= 0, the equation stands for the standard
deviation of the genitourinary system drugs. Other letters have the same mean as the same letters of the
Mortality Sample Model have.

The results of the Full Sample Model are in table 5.3. The mean, the mean of the price per mg/ml and the
number of the different strengths are still positively related to the price discrimination. Meanwhile, the price
discrimination among the USA drugs is still lower 0.967 point than the price discrimination among the
Chinese drugs. And the price discrimination of the immunologic is the smallest. The parameter estimates of
α8 is -1.796.
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Meanwhile, we eliminate the variable, the mean of the price per mg/ml. All the results are in table 5.3. The
mortality rate of the diseases is negatively related to the price discrimination, the price discrimination of the
USA drugs is higher, and the price discrimination of the central nervous drugs is the lowest.

Moreover, we have discovered one situation that the differences of some drugs’ prices with the different
strengths are very small. We count the price per pill/bottle/capsule and find that most of them do not have too
much difference. And the situation is common in the USA and the Chinese drugs. Such as the cefadroxil
(Chinese drugs), 0.039 dollars/pill with 250mg, and 0.037 dollars/pill with 125mg. Among the USA drugs,
some of the same drugs with different strengths have almost the same price per pill/bottle/capsule. For
instance, Vesicare has the same price, 4.38 dollars, with the 5mg and 10mg. Basing on that situation, we
could conclude that the pricing of the drug is almost like the flat pricing. Because the pricing of the drugs is
not based on the marginal cost of the materials, is based on the technology of developing the drugs. So
whatever how much mg/ml you bought, you just need to pay for almost the same price.

Finally, in this whole thesis, we exchange the yuan to dollar, and the exchange rate of one renminbi is 0.1547
dollars.
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Table 5.1-Results of the Model I
Parameter Estimate
Anti-infective
the USA

Antineoplastic

China

the USA

China

Cardiovascular System

Central Nervous System

the USA

the USA

China

Gastrointestinal Tract

China

the USA

China

Intercept

0.062
(0.053)

-4.574e-05
(4.548e-04)

-15.133
(5.960)

-0.017
(0.117)

-0.161

9.4e-04
(0.006)

0.032
(0.411)

-1.64e-03
(0.002)

1.279
(2.100)

-4.71e-06
(6.443e-04)

Mortality

-86.488
(82.838)

2.256
(1.333)

-14520
(20841)

-31.631
(63.923)

-5152.197

2.373
(7.799)

277.968
(2021.215)

-16.620
(31.776)

-40778
(36176)

0.3946
(6.978)

-0.031
(0.020)

-1.241e-04
(1.303e-04)

7.312
(2.623)

0.016
(0.036)

0.027

-7.375e-04
(0.002)

0.038
(0.061)

4.203e-04
(4.132e-04)

-0.071
(0.371)

8.48e-06
1.190e-04

1.105
(0.206)

0.254
(0.031)

0.208
(0.196)

0.265
(0.054)

1.015

0.741
(0.061)

0.325
(0.099)

0.217
(0.063)

0.318
(0.032)

0.090
(0.030)

R-square

0.984

0.741

0.923

0.996

1

0.995

0.579

0.926

0.993

0.917

Obs

8

28

6

5

4

5

12

5

5

5

Number
of
different
strengths

Mean
Price
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Table 5.2-Summary Statistics for the Mortality Sample
Model and the Full Sample Model
Mortality
Full
Sample
Sample
Variables:
Mean Price
2.1
5.388
(6.955)
(32.13)
Standard Deviation Price

0.739
(3.041)

2.618
(18.838)

Mortality

1.717e-04
(2.472e-04)

-------

3.627
(1.859)

3.534
(1.791)

Anti-infective

0.434
(0.499)

0.305
(0.462)

Antineoplastic

0.133
(0.341)

0.093
(0.292)

Cardiovascular System

0.108
(0.312)

0.076
(0.267)

Central Nervous System

0.205
(0.406)

0.144
(0.353)

Gastrointestinal Tract

-----

0.085
(0.28)

Hematologic

------

0.059
(0.237)

Hormonal

------

0.136
(0.344)

Immunologic

------

0.034
(0.182)

the USA (Yes=1)

0.422
(0.497)

0.492
(0.502)

Number of Different
Strengths
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Table 5.3-Results of the Mortality Sample Model and Full Sample Model
Mean Price Including

Mean Price Not Including

Mortality
Sample

Full
Sample

Mortality Sample

Full Sample

Parameter
Estimate

Parameter
Estimate

Parameter Estimate

Parameter Estimate

Intercept

-0.848
(0.671)

-0.322
(0.960)

1.122
(1.226)

0.001
(7.855 )

Mortality

601.109
(825.339)

-------

606.699
(1544.824)

-------

0.099

0.172

0.025

-0.367

(0.106)

(0.138)

(0.199 )

(1.128)

Mean Price

0.398
(0.029)

0.585
(0.007)

-------

-------

the USA(yes=1)

-0.107
(0.412)

-0.967
(0.486)

1.704
(0.730)

2.288
(3.962 )

Anti-infective

0.458
(0.602)

-0.003
(0.915)

-1.675
(1.089)

0.652
(7.493 )

Antineoplastic

-0.269
(0.733)

-1.614
1.078

-0.286
(1.372)

1.74
(8.818)

0.612

0.054

-1.160

1.812

(0.794)

(1.155)

(1.466)

(9.456)

0.511

0.082

-1.983

0.641

(0.678)

(1.039)

(1.222)

(8.501 )

------

-1.542

------

2.189

Number of
different strengths

Cardiovascular
System

Central Nervous
System

Gastrointestinal
Tract

(1.102)

(9.016)
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Hematologic

-------

-0.693
(1.218)

-------

1.617
(9.966)

Hormonal

-------

0.2
(1.031)

-------

13.861
(8.342)

Immunologic

--------

-1.796
(1.443)

-------

1.121
(11.805)

R-square

0.757

0.986

0.138

0.073

Observations

83

118

83

118
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Figure 5.1- The Standard Deviation VS the Mean of Price per mg/ml
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Figure 5.2- The Standard Deviation VS the Number of Different Strengths
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION

The topic of the price discrimination is not very new topic, and many economists have study this topics in
many field. However, just few papers discuss the price discrimination among the drugs with different
strengths. Because usually we do not pay attention to that the price per mg/ml of the same drug is different
among different strengths.

Meanwhile, the drug market is one of the perfect examples to study the price discrimination. Price
discrimination means the producers offer same product or service to different customer with different prices.
Not every producer has the power of carrying out the price discrimination. And the drug market satisfies
these two conditions.

The assumption of this thesis is that five factors may affect the degree of price discrimination. They are the
existing number of the unique drugs in each category, the prices of the drugs, the number of the different
strengths among one unique drug, the mortality rate of the diseases and the policies of the different
governments. In order to demonstrate the assumption, we have observed the two countries’ drug markets. We
just choose the drugs with different strengths, and sort them out, based on the diseases that they are used to
treat. The mean and the standard deviation of the price per mg/ml are two parameters to testify the
hypothesis.

Finally, the data set supports most hypotheses. We could conclude that the degree of price discrimination is
positively relative to the price of drugs, the number of the different strengths and the number of the different
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strengths in any unique drug, and the degree of the price discrimination in the USA drug’s market is lower
than the Chinese drug’s market. Based on what we have found, customer could reduce the cost by choosing
the drugs with high strengths, if there is no special strength limits.
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APPENDIX
Table A1. Broad class categories as in Nursing Drug Handbook, 2011
Anti- infective (163)
amebicides, antiprotozoals,
and anthelmintics
antituberculotics
antifungals
antimalarials
macrolide anti-infectives

aminoglycosides
penicillins
sulfonamides
scabicides and
pediculicides
cephalosporins

tetracyclines
antivirals
local anti-infectives
fluoroquinolones
antiretrovirals
miscellaneous

Cardiovascular system drugs (139)

antianginals
antilipemics
diuretics

vasodilators
antiarrhythmics
vasopressors
inotropics

thrombolytic enzymes
blood derivatives

Hematologic drugs (50)
platelet drugs
anticoagulants
neutropenia drugs

miscellaneous
antihypertensives

antianemics

Central nervous system drugs (178)
alzheimer's disease drugs
antiparkinsonians
anxiolytics
antimigraine drugs
nonopioid analgesics and
antipyretics

sedative-hypnotics
CNS stimulants
anticonvulsants
nonsteroidal antiinflammatories
opioid analgesics

antipsychotics
antidepressants
attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder
drugs

Musculoskeletal system drugs (30)
skeletal muscle relaxants
parathyroid-like drugs

antirheumatics
antiresorptive drugs

neuromuscular blockers
antigout drugs

Respiratory tract drugs (47)
antihistamines

bronchodilators
Gastrointestinal tract drugs (77)
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miscellaneous

antacids, absorbents, and
antiflatulents
bowel disorder drugs
antiemetics

miscellaneous
antiulceratives and reflux
drugs
antidiarrheals

laxatives

Genitourinary system drugs (17)
benign prostatic
hyperplasia drugs

erectile dysfunction drugs
incontinence drugs

miscellaneous

Hormonal drugs (103)
androgens and anabolic
steroids
estrogens and progestins
fertility drugs
thyroid hormones

parenteral antidiabetics and
glucagon
steroidal antiinflammatories
oxytocics

pituitary hormones
thyroid hormone
antagonists
topical anti-inflammatories
oral antidiabetics

Antineoplastic (85)
Antineoplastic that alter
hormone balance
antimetabolites

alkylating drugs
antibiotic Antineoplastic
antimitotic drugs

miscellaneous

Immunologic drugs (37)
immunosuppressants

immunomodulators

immune serums

Ophthalmic and nasal drugs (52)
ophthalmic antiinflammatories
miotics and mydriatics
antiglaucoma drugs

ophthalmic
vasoconstrictors and
antihistamines
ophthalmic anti-infectives
Miscellaneous categories* (68)

antagonists and antidotes
electrolyte balancing drugs

nutritional drugs
uncategorized drugs

* includes the categories created by me in addition to NDH
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nasal drugs
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